The Crito

Socrates - Krito

S: Why have you come so early, Krito; or is it not yet dawn?
K: It’s just morning. S: What time, exactly? K: Almost day-
break. S: I’m surprised the prison guard was willing to
answer when you knocked. K: He’s gotten used to me,
Socrates, from my coming here so many times; and I might
have given him some favor. S: Did you arrive just now or
while ago? K: Fairly a while. S: Then why did you not
wake me right up instead of sitting there in silence? K: O
by God, no Socrates: I myself w’ld I were not so sleepless
in pain, but I sit here amazed at seeing how sweet you ’re
asleep; and I kept from waking you on purpose so that you
could continue as sweetly as possible; and oftentimes even
before, I counted you entirely lucky because of your way of
life, but most especially as the situation stands right now, so
easily and willing do you bear your bad luck. S: Well Krito,
it would be absurd to get annoyed, being at such an age, if
it is necessary to make an end already. K: And other men as
old as you have been taken in such bad luck, but their age
did not keep them from being annoyed at the present fate.

S: That is so; but why are you here so early? K: I've come with a
terrible message…apparently not for you as it seems to me, but
for me and your friends, us all, something awfully crushing;
which I, do I believe, might bear heaviest of them. S: What
is it? That the boat arrived from Delos, at whose coming I
must die? K: No it is not here, but that I think it will come on
the morrow from what some people coming in from Sunios
who'd gone from there to here, announced. So from these
messages it's clear that it will come tomorrow and that at
day you ’ill have to end your life. S: But, oh Krito, good;
luckily, if this is pleasing to the gods, let it be thus. But I do
not think it’l be here this very day. K: Where do you get y-
our proof of this? S: I’ll tell you: because surely I must die on
the day after the one the ship arrives. K: They say—at least,
that is—the ones who’re in charge of this. S: I don’t think
it will even be here to-day, but on the one after; I get that fr-
om something I saw a short while ago in a dream during
this very night: you even dared not waking me just in the
nick of time. K: But what was your dream about, Socrates?

S: A woman seemed to me to come approach, beautiful, a delight to
look on; dressed in white, she called me & said: "Oh S O C R A T E S,
‘It’s on the third day you shall arrive at the fertile land of Pthia’."

K: It is a strange dream, Socrates. S: Well it seemed obvious
enough to me, Krito. K: Entirely, just as it seem’s/d. But
o, blessed Socrates, believe me still even now & be saved
since, to me, if you die, it is not only a disaster, but apart
from my being robbed of so great a friend, whose like I
will never find again; but yet many folks will think (the
ones who do not kno’ you or I too well) that I could have
saved you if I’d been willing to spend some cash, but did
not care. And really, what opinion could be more horrible
than this, or to be thought that money was considered more
important than friends? ’Cause most people will not believe
you yourself refused to escape from here, though we had
set our hearts to it. S: But why, dear Krito, are we so involved
in the opinion of the crowd? For the most worthy ones, of
whom it is more proper to consider, will think things were
so done, just as done they ought. K: But look, see how one
must take care of the opinion of the mob: and the present
situation itself it is quite clear that a lot of people are not
capable of carrying out some tiny, but close to the most
terrible, evils if one falls afoul of th’aspersions they cast.

S: And if the many were able to accomplish the most horrible
acts in pursuit of the greatest good, it would also be alright.
But presently they are not able to do either because they’re
not capable of making someone reasoned or insane, but do
whichever thing they happen to hit upon. K: Then let those
things be so; but tell me this, Socrates: Are you watching
out for me and for your friends, that if you escape from
here (I bet the prosecutors will offer us the chance to steal
you away from here), we not also be compelled either to
lose our property entire or a fair amount of money, suffer
even something else for these? 'Cause if you are afraid of
some such thing as this, wave it away right now; because
we are certainly right to take this risk in saving you and,
if it's necessary, even something more. So you have no
choice but to believe me! S: I am looking out for these,
Krito, & many other things. K: So there is nothing for
you to fear—actually it’s really not much money that
certain folks are willing to accept to save and take you
away from this place. So why do you not see these dirty
officials as cheap and we wouldn’t even need much silver
for them? & the money of mine that’s yours is, I think,
enough; so even if you’re anxious over my account &
do not think you need to use up mine, these friends of
yours are willing to spend their own; one has even made
offer enough for this very cause, Simmias from Thebes;
and your friend Cebes and quite a few others. So what I’m
saying is: Do not let fear of this make you fail to save your
skin and, like I said to you in court, don’t be troubled be-
cause you wouldn’t, if you leave, know what to do since
in a lot of places—I mean wherever you go—they will
adore and welcome you; and if you want to go to Thessaly,
I have plenty of friends there who’ll make a big to-do for
you and make sure you’re safe and sound so no Thessalian
bothers you. But Socrates, I still don't think you are trying
to undertake a proper course of action, to give yourself up;
when it's possible to be saved? You're even eager for such
things to happen about you, which even your enemies
would and want too, and those who want to destroy you.
In response to them you seem (to me at least) to betray
your sons as well whom, although able to both raise and
teach, you will abandon when you leave; & as for your
part, what they happen on this will they do: But they will
do, as it seems, such things as are wont to happen in foster-
homes to orphans. One must either not have children or,
in nourishing to raise, last through troubles with them;
but to me, you seem to pick whatever's easiest. What a
noble and brave man would choose must one pick too;
that is, if he claims to care about virtue throughout his
entire life: So I, both on your behalf and that of we, your
useful friends, am ashamed that the entire affair not
look—the one concerning you—like it was conducted
by our woman's cowardice, and your appearance for the
charge in court as you entered plea although no need and
ordeal of the trial itself and then, this outcome!, how
ridiculous a thing; that we seem to have abandoned utterly
in our lowly fearfulness, who did not save you, not you
yourself and it was possibly in our power, if only some
small help from us... So see, oh Socrates; these facts that
shame not be coupled with evil for you and for us both.
But I am warning you—and it is more the time we should
have planned rather than be planning for—but only one plan:
For all these matters must be done within this very night
and if we wait any more, powerless and no longer can.
But Socrates, in every way believe me and do nothing else!

S: Oh my love Krito, your desired wishes so worthy if it were
upright in some vain; but if not, to be better by as much as
more difficult. Therefore we must look closely at whether
these things ought to be done or no, as I not at the moment
primarily, rather even am always of such a sort as to not be
persuaded by anyone else of my own so much as by the
argument whichever seems best to my reasoning. Really,
the reasons I was arguing before am I unable now to cast
off since this turn of chance became my way & seem pretty
near alike to me, but I am first their eldest representative
valuing them the same even before; & if we grasp no finer
reasoning in present circumstance, you better be sure I'll
never give way to you—many people's power'd not be greater
than the matters present, like it frightens us as children, send-
ing chains and threats of death and confiscating our things.
So how could we not examine them as moderately as
possible? If we take up then this logic first, you say it's
about opinions. Whether this is repeatedly well-stated
each time or no, must one apply their mind to these opin-
ions but not those? Or before it was well pronounced that
I must die, but now suddenly became clear that it was de-
cided differently for the sake of argument, and was actual-
ly childish foolishness? But I want to look closely at, Krito,
together with you, whether something appears different,
since I am so, or the same which we let go bye or believe
in it. And however it was reasoned, so I think, on each
occasion by the ones thinking they say something, just
like I'm making sense right now, that from the opinions
which people believe it is necessary that some are made
a great deal of, but the others no. Doesn't this, from the
Gods, oh Krito, seem to be well opined to you? Now
since you (as these are things human) are not at death's
door today, and the impending event misleads you not,
look here: Does it not appear sufficiently logical to you
not to pay people's opinions homage, every one, but rather
to some and not others? Not everyone's but some people's,
others' no? Wha' d' you say? Do these things seem said well?

K: Well, yes. S: Then honor the useful and not the lowly?
K: Yup. S: But are the useful ones not of the steadfastly
sensible, but worthless opinions of the senseless ones?
K: Why not? S: Oh come now: Why repeat such things
again? When a man trains physically, & really practices,
does he pay attention to everybody's praise and blame
and opinion, or only that one who happens to be a doctor
or trainer? K: Only one. S: Then ought he be afraid of
the reproaches and gladly accept compliments of that one
but not from the crowd? K: Clearly indeed. S: Then he
must act and practice and even eat & drink as the one
best deems—the one who stands listening and feels be-
side—more than with all the others so. K: That is thus.
S: So then if he disobeys the one and respects his judgment
not and compliments, but honors most people's arguments,
even of those who do not comprehend, is he convinced that
nothing's wrong? K: Well, how could he not? S: And what
kind of mistake is this and how far does it reach and what
about the words of the one who doesn't heed? K: Clearly
that's about the body: Since this does he destroy. S: A
reasoned reply. So in relation to the other facts, Krito, that
we not dismiss them all, and especially about just and un-
just people and things disgusting and gorgeous, both ones
excellent and bad about which our wills' design relate to
whether we must follow the majority's opinion, be even
afraid of it, or that of someone, if there is one, encouraging
whom it is necessary to feel shame towards and fear more
than all the rest; with which if we will go along, shall we
corrupt and slight the thing that was, is better as regards the
right and be ruined by the one that's wrong, or is this no-
thing at all? K: I, at least, think so-Socrates. S: Come on,
if we ruin the thing made better by what's healthy, but by
sickliness becomes worse, in believing the ones who profess
knowledge, is it then, for our part, worth living as it's being
destroyed? But is this thing a body or not? K: Yeah. S: So
we should live with a wretched and corrupted form? K: No
way. S: But must we continue to live with that thing when
it is corrupting through which the unjust deteriorates where-
as the right one does good to? Or do we consider worse that
which is of the body’s form at times is ours & in relation to
it there are both injustice and proper right? K: Not at all. S:
Well, more honorable? K: Totally. S: No then, we should
not care so very much what most people say about us in-
stead of that which is of one who knows about the right
ones and wrong, who is one understands the truth itself.
As at first in this way you make incorrect representation,
to start off by stating we must be concerned about what
most people think concerning the just and beautiful and
good, things and people opposite. "Oh but," might some-
one say, "many have the power to kill us." K: That’s al-
so pretty clear; Socrates, should you say that, you will
be telling truths. S: But my impresario: This is the argu-
ment which to me, at least, it seems we have just gone
straight throu’h yet to be alike even before; but look also
at this again to see whether it stays the same or no, since
living must not be made for the most, but rather with re-
spect to living well. K: But it’s the same. S: And the
good and noble and just life which is the same, does it
change or remain? K: It stays. S: So from agreements
must be examined whether I am justified in trying to go
away from here—though Athenians do not set free—or
it’s unjust; and if, on the one hand, it seems just, let’s try
it: But if on the other not, we let go. Now the consider-
ations you voice about spending money and reputation
and raising children, these as in truth are speculations
of those dying too easily and of those who would even
bring them back alive if they could sans any attention
to these of people in the crowd. But for us, since the con-
versation takes hold like this, there is no other thing which
must be examined besides what we are and have been
saying whether we will do things which are justified and
spend resources on those who purpose to lead me away
from here and offer thanks, ourselves even leading and
being led off at once, or truthfully will we pervert justice
should we do all these things; & if we are seen to commit
acts which are unjust, it is imperative not to take into ac-
count neither whether the ones standing their ground and
leading a peaceful life are to die nor suffer any other thing
at all instead of act unjust. K: I think you state things well
but see, what we’re doing… S: Let’s look, oh brave soul,
at together and if you have some way to respond to me
speaking, reply and I feel will believe you; but if not, stop
repeating right, my good sir!, away to me the same argument
as though I must go away from here because Athenians are
unwilling, since I make a big deal of urging that you do
these things, but not if you don’t want. And see for sure if
the beginning of the question is sufficiently stated for you
and I will try to answer the doubt how you’d think best.

K: Well I will try. S: Do we say we are absolutely, entire-
ly unwilling to commit an act of injustice, or that some-
thing wrong must be done in one way but not another?
Or is acting unjustly in no way useful or good, as we so
often in time gone past agreed? Or have all those agree-
ments made before in these few days been overturned
and old, Krito, men conversing for such a long time so
eagerly with each other have not noticed that we are our-
selves no different than children? Or is it, after all, just
as was agreed on by us then, whether a lot of people
say so or not; and if we must still undergo things even
more difficult, or even not so tough, does injustice, for
all that, still happen to be evil and shameful to the one
acting unjustly in every way? Do we agree or not? K:
We do. S: So there is no need at all to do or be wrong?
K: Not at all. S: Then must the one who’s being wrong-
ed commit no injustice in return (not like so many think),
since it is necessary to never be unjust? K: It seems no.
S: But, what?! Ought one do something wrong, Krito,
or no? K: It is absolutely necessary to not, Socrates.
S: & why? Someone being mistreated who in return
does something bad, as so many say is just, is justified
or wrong? K: Completely unjust. S: But surely treat-
ing people badly is no different than the’ being unjust.
K: Words you say are true. S: Therefore it is necessary that
one neither return wrong or act badly towards another
person, nor should they suffer anything from others. And
Krito, look assuming you agree with these so as not to
contradict yourself—for you know that things seem right to
a certain few and will be assumed.—so for those who have
decided this as well, also for those not, there will be no
agreement for these held in common; instead, they are ob-
liged to agree with one another when they see each other's
intentions. Then you also look at whether really agree and
it seems best to you as well and let's begin planning from
here how…it is never o.k. to do wrong nor be unjust nor
be wrong in return, not even if being treated viley to fight
off the one who is doing evil in return, or do you disagree
and not consider this a common point of origin? Because
for a while even up to now I've had my mind made up, but
if you have come to a different conclusion, tell me to show
what it is. And if you're staying with the same as before,
listen to what's next. K: But I do insist and it seems right
to me; but speak. S: I say truly again what's next, but more
of a question: Whether what someone agrees as is just must
be done to one or should it be feigned as true? K: Be done.

S: From that, look into this: Going from there, but if we trust in
the city-state, do we either treat certain people badly (and
those who deserve the worst) or no? K: I can not respond,
Socrates, to what you ask; I have no idea. S: But look here.
If we are about to either run off from here or whatever this
ought be called, the laws came understanding in common
our state and said, "Tell me, oh Socrates, what you think you
are doing? Other than using this act to intend and trying to
abolish we who are the laws, habits and the entire city or
state just to destroy yourself? Or does it seem impossible
that that city still exist and has yet to have been overthrown?
The one in which judgments would had occurred should
not be strong enough at all, instead were worthless from per-
sonal gain and seduced by corruption?" What would we say
Krito, to these and such other statements? A person wo-
uld have to be a lot of things; that, and especially a good
speaker to talk about this thing being destroyed, the law
which set-up the judgments considered best to have authority
over all. Or do we tell them, ‘But the city/state did wrong
to us and did not judge just our cause?’ That or, what do
we say? K: By God, this—Socrates! S: Then what should
the laws say?, "Um, Socrates: Hadn’t we agreed, both us
and you, upon these thing already? But to abide by the
decisions which the people’s government think just?"
Then if we were amazed that they were speaking, they
might respond, "Oh Socrates, don’t be shocked at what
is being argued here, answer instead. Since it has been
your habit to use questioning and also be answered.
Now come, why are you trying to ruin us and the state by
making allegations? Did we not first off give place to your
birth, and weren’t we there when your father took your
mom and gave you life? So tell those of our laws which
concern marriages how you accuse them not being right."
I would say, ‘I don’t blame.’ "What about to the ones
which concern encouraging production and child-rearing
both in which you yourself were also raised? Or didn’t
the laws which have been provided for this properly
assign your father the task of training you in harmony
and athletics?" ‘They were,’ I would say, ‘fine.’ "Well,
since you became and grew up and were raised, could
you tell us to start how you were not both our baby and
slave, either yourself or ancestors? And if this thing real-
ly is so, then do you think what is just equally for you &
us, even that if we tried to make such things, you would
think that doing these in opposition would be ’s just? Or
is justice not equally right to your father and master, if
one you happen to have, so what you experience you do
not recompense and hearing evil you not respond and be-
ing struck, strike back not and a lot of other such acts;
but to your fatherland and its laws it will be so in your
power that if we try to destroy you because we think it
just, and you also will try to destroy we—the laws—&
your country so far as you are able in return will you al-
so say that if you do this you are practicing justice, as
in truth you care about what's virtuous? Or are you so
wise it has escaped you that your beloved country is a
thing more honorable than both mother & father and y-
our other relatives all, it is more solemn and holy held
in greater esteem even by gods and people who under-
stand and that to be honored it is needed more to submit
and serve your father's land than your dad, to either be-
lieve or do what it demands and suffer if an order is given
to someone keeping the peace to feel—even should one
be stricken and with fear—and if you undertake the goal
of wounding or murdering in war these things have to be
done and thus is this just and one must not yield, cannot
withdraw or give up the task, but even in war and in court
and everywhere you need to do what your city and the
country command or convince it of what justice is; but
to dishonor mother and father is outrage to god and still
much worse to violate country." What will we say to
this, Krito? That the laws speak truths or no? K: Looks
like it to me. S: "But now look Socrates," perhaps the laws
would say, "if we are telling you these things are true &
that what you are trying to make us do is wrong which
you are doing right now because we have made, raised,
taught & trained, handed you all of what we are for your
good and that of all the others citizens, still do we publicly
proclaim by having made opportunity available for any
willing Athenian, since when he has been judged worthy
and seen matters in the city/state and that we are the laws
(and finds us displeasing to him) is he able to take his own
and go wherever he please. And no one of our laws is in the
way or prevents: If one of you wants to go to a foreign settle-
ment should both we and the constitution displease, even if
you moved here from somewhere else as a settler and you
wish to go off to that place, you may take your things and
leave. But if one of you stays knowing how we justify our
judgments and govern the city in other ways, we immediate-
ly say this agreement has been made de facto with us; and if
we urge doing these things and he does not obey, we say he
is three ways wrong: He does not believe his parents and
those who raised him and that he agreed to obey us and in
misbelieving does not persuade us whether we are doing
something wrong, even though we proposed and politely
arranged that he do what we command, but established
either of two ways—convince us or act—but neither he does.
We state that even you are, Socrates, subject to these charges
if you actually do what you have in mind and you not least
among the Athenians, but most out of them." Then if I were
to say, ‘For what reason, why?’ perhaps they would say,
quite justifiably in castigation, that of the Athenians in par-
ticular, I happen to have consented to this agreement most.
But they would say, "Whoa Socrates, we have a lot of
evidence to prove that you found both us and the republic
good; now, didn’t you ever live in it at home above the
other Athenians all? Must have been pretty pleasing to you;
did not even ever come outside of the city to see a festival,
except that one time to the Isthmian games; did not go any-
where to any other place except for marching off to be a
soldier? You did not make a single trip abroad at any time
like the other people, no longing for another city, no wish
to know about other laws took you; rather good enough
to you were we and the state? So that you chose to accept
us and agreed to act a citizen according to us, even went so
far as to have children believing the city-state was good
for you. In fact even at your trial was it still within your
power to propose exile if you wanted, and what you are
attempting now that the city does not consent to you could
have done when it was willing to. But you back then were
being smart like you wouldn't have to unless it be necessary
to but chose as if giving up to die rather than flee; and now
you are not ashamed of those arguments, you do not respect
we who are the laws by trying to destroy and practice the
very acts which the most lowly slave would perform by
trying to run away contrary to the terms of the contracts
according to which you agreed you are a citizen. By all
means first answer us this: Do we tell the truth in arguing
that you have agreed to behave like a citizen as we say in
fact but not in thought or are we wrong?" What ought we
say to this, Krito? Except that we agree. K: Absolutely
Socrates. S: "So then how else," they’d say, "are you
transgressing the compacts and agreements which you
have made with us ourselves? You did not have to agree,
were not deceived, weren't forced to decide rather hastily;
but in all the seventy years you've had to go away, if we
were so often unpleasant to you, judgments were not seen
by you as agreements. But you did not choose Sparta or
Crete for your own or any other of the Greek cities, or e’en
foreign states; you went away from it still less than the
cripples and blind, others severely disabled; so obviously
that the state and its laws were repeatedly acceptable to you,
if not more so than to the other Athenians is clear; for how
could someone find a city pleasing without its laws as
custom? But now you don't abide by the agreements which
were made? Maybe you could convince us, Socrates; and
you won't be a laughing-stock when you'll have departed
from the city. Now look carefully whether you overstep
your bounds and do what is good as relates to yourself or
those who are useful to you. That your friends are going to
risk their lives and even go into exile and lay wastage of
the city or destroy its livelihood is pretty obvious; but if
you yourself first-off went to places which were so alike
in some way, like Thebes or Megara—since they would
both consider you well—will you go as an enemy, Socrates,
to the constitutionality of these states and just as many
people are troubled about their own will despise as if think-
ing you a corrupter of the customary laws and you were
convicted of such penalty from the judges that it seem the
price just is to pay since whoever is a filthy breaker of the
law would they probably consider one who would corrupt
the young and swindle ignorant folks; thus whether you
flee the cities which think of you best and their most
eminent, orderly citizens. And for your doing this your life
is suddenly still worthwhile? Or you'll approach them & be
put to shame in conversations with respect to what reasons,
Socrates? The ones you used here, about how virtue and just-
ice are most worthy for human beings and their habits and
the laws? And don't you think Socrates' busy-ness will seem
pretty unseemly? Even you must know that. But from these
cities disagreeable you will go to Thessaly to see Krito's
friends as a guest? And there surely are full disorder and im-
moral acts and maybe they would hear you sweetly as you
repeat ridiculous about running off away from prison, put
one over on them or how you saved your skin or some other
things such as fugitives are in the habit of arming themselves
with dressing up and how you sold out to buy your scheme;
and since you are old man—such with tiny time left in life
as it appears—you dare so laughably desirous to live
violating the most powerful laws are not one to talk? Perhaps
you'd not hurt some; but if no, will hear a lot of unworthy
things about your self. You will live to undermine everyone
and be a slave? Doing nothing but going off to live as if every-
thing is well in Thessaly, like you had packed up and moved
over a meal to dine in Thessaly? These shall be your justifi-
cation for justice and any, some other virtue to us? But do
you really want to live on for the children, in order to raise
them and teach? Why? After you take them to Thessaly, will
you feed and train, make then foreigners so you may enjoy
this benefit as well? Either this is a 'no' and being nourished
here while you live they will be better raised and receive
education, but only if you are here for them? Because your
friends' service will care for them. Or is it that should you
go off to live in Thessaly, they'll care for them, but if you
move down to Hades' home they shall not take care? Even
as if there were to be from them some sort of help, it is of
these saying they are friends—you must at least do think.

"Oh but Socrates, if you believe we are like your parents,
don’t make your kids a bigger deal, do not place living
life or any thing else before justice so that when you go
to the afterlife you may have all these statements in your
defense for the rulers there, because to you it does not
seem here that, if you do these things, it is better or more
just or holier, neither to anyone of your family nor friends,
and it won’t be any better when you have gotten there;
but right now if you have been treated wrong, leave: If
you go away you are not leaving the laws, just us—but
rather from humankind; and if you do depart so shameful-
ly in requiting injustice with like by contriving unjustness
in return, you sidestep your own agreements and contracts
contrary to us and, through acting wrong, do injury to
those one least ought to harm—yourself, friends, country
and us—we’ll be angry at you if still alive and our bro-
thers there the Laws in Hades’ will not receive you very
patiently in kind, for they’ll ’ve known how you tried to
annihilate us for your own share so don’t let Krito con-
vince you to do what he argues more than what we do."

Know well my dear companion Krito, that these are what
I believe I hear just like the circus acrobats think they still
hear the reed-flutes when performances are done, and the
sound of these arguments rings thundering and makes me
unable to hear anything else; but know as many things as
currently seem right to me, if you speak against them, are
you speaking to no end; but still if you think you’ve some
thing more to add, speak. K: But Socrates, I can’t talk!

S: Then let go, oh Krito, and let us act like this since thus
as the way by which the god indicates he leads is guide.